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By Carole Burgess and Larry N. Killough
Over the last several years the ac­
counting profession has come under 
attack from public interest groups, con­
gressional committees, the press, and 
business writers. However, accounting 
is just one of several professions be­
ing beseiged by the advocates of 
public responsibility. To better under­
stand accounting’s problems, it is im­
portant to take a broad look at the 
nature of American professions in the 
late 20th century.
A profession is an institution and 
possibly a monopoly; it must have a 
definite purpose and require special 
training. In order to comply with socie­
ty’s requirements for a profession, 
educational standards are established, 
competency examinations are ad­
ministered, and various codes govern­
ing behavior are required. However, 
below the surface, the professions suc­
cessfully create a guild calling for 
restraint of competition in the name of 
better service to the public. The public 
often views this as a move toward 
elitism. Thus, the profession’s 
members are set apart from the 
general public and a monopoly is 
created.1
Because a profession’s functions 
center on public service, its members 
are necessarily at the mercy of the 
public’s will. Society allows the profes­
sion a limited set of privileges expec­
ting the members to perform these 
functions efficiently and effectively. 
However, expecting a profession com­
posed of individuals to act in a uniform­
ly expert manner is unrealistic. There 
will, inevitably, be superior perfor­
mance by some members of a profes­
sion, failures by others, and much 
performance which falls into the me­
dian between these two. Failure to 
meet a changing society’s standards 
leads to public displeasure and 
sometimes distrust endangering the 
profession’s privileges.2
The current public assault on the ac­
counting profession is an outgrowth of 
the Watergate investigations, cor­
porate failures, frauds, and briberies 
encountered in the early 1970s. These 
events brought the attention of the 
public and government to the business 
community in general, and specifical­
ly to the accounting profession. As a 
result, Congress conducted several 
investigations into the Securities Ex­
change Commission’s (SEC) manage­
ment of matters involving corporate 
accountability, accounting, and 
auditing.
The first Congressional report came 
from Congressman John E. Moss’s 
subcommittee in October 1976. They 
concluded that the SEC should not 
continue to rely on self-regulation in 
the accounting profession because of 
the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board’s (FASB) tarnished image. 
Similarly, the staff report prepared by 
the late Senator Lee Metcalf for sub­
committee hearings on the accounting 
profession was critical of the SEC’s 
oversight; it proposed that more 
legislation was needed to regulate 
accountants.
While Metcalf and other critics of the 
accounting profession and the FASB 
discussed federal standards for ac­
counting and auditing, the American 
Institute of CPA’s (AICPA) Commis­
sion on Auditors Responsibilities (The 
Cohen Commission) concluded that 
the present combination of private and 
government regulation effectively 
maintained audit quality. However, the 
Cohen Commission documented that 
there was substantial room for im­
provement in the area of self­
regulation. As a result of the SEC’s 
continued support of self-regulation, 
the Metcalf subcommittee’s recom­
mendations issued in November 1977 
emphasized self-regulation for the ac­
counting profession with SEC 
oversight.
Structure For Self-Regulation
Following the 1977 Senate Subcom­
mittee hearings, the accounting pro­
fession was faced with either the pros­
pect of revising its present regulatory 
processes or submitting to public 
regulation. The profession chose the 
former option and formulated a self- 
regulatory plan through the AICPA. 
The principal elements of the plan 
were a SEC Practice Section 
monitored by non-CPAs and peer 
review.
The SEC Practice Section (SECPS) 
is one of two sections created in 1977 
when the AICPA established a Division 
for CPA Firms. Membership in the 
SECPS dictates that a firm follow rigid 
quality control standards and meet 
numerous requirements, including 
peer review. An Executive committee 
oversees the Section’s activities; it can 
impose sanctions such as additional 
continuing education requirements, 
special peer reviews, censures, fines, 
and expulsion from membership. The 
Public Oversight Board (POB), in turn, 
oversees the Executive Committee of 
the SECPS.
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Another element of the SECPS is a 
special investigations committee (SIC). 
The SIC examines evidence of al­
leged audit failures and makes recom­
mendations concerning further 
investigation and sanctions to the Ex­
ecutive Committee.
Members of both the SECPS and 
the Private Companies Practice Sec­
tion (PCPS) are required to undergo a 
peer review every three years. The 
purpose of peer review is to evaluate 
a firm’s quality control system and 
determine if there is reasonable 
assurance that the firm is meeting pro­
fessional standards. Accordingly, the 
peer review process is the foundation 
of self-regulation.
Before the peer review can begin, 
the firm being reviewed prepares a 
quality control document which 
describes their quality control system 
and checks for compliance with 
prescribed measures by examining 
working paper files and reports. Com­
pliance with membership requirements 
of the division for firms is also exam­
ined during the review. At the conclu­
sion of the review, a written report is 
presented at a meeting called an exit 
conference. Both the SECPS peer 
review committee and the POB are 
notified of upcoming exit conferences 
involving members of the SECPS.
For self-regulation to be 
effective, more than the self­
interest of those regulated 
must be considered.
Several rules have been estab­
lished to govern the composition and 
qualifications of those conducting 
reviews. Review teams may be pro­
vided by the AICPA, an association or 
a state CPA society or one firm may 
engage another. However, reciprocal 
reviews are not allowed; the two firms 
must be independent of each other. 
Members of the review team must be 
CPAs and be highly knowledgeable in 
the reviewed firm’s specialty areas. In 
addition to the work of the SECPS peer 
review committee, the POB monitors 
the peer review process.
The POB was forced to oversee the 
activities of the SECPS. The composi­
tion of the POB reflects the profes­
sion’s desire to represent the users of 
financial statements and to improve 
public service. Of its five members, 
four must be nonaccountants. 
Because of the profession’s desire to 
maintain a self-regulation program, the 
POB has line authority. Its real power 
results from the right to attend the 
meetings and activities of every sec­
tion committee and the duty to report 
to the SEC and the public on the ade­
quacy of the profession’s self- 
regulatory program.3 Specific POB 
duties include consulting with SECPS 
executive committee on current 
issues, overseeing the peer reviews of 
member firms, attending exit con­
ferences, examining the investigative 
efforts resulting from the SIC, and con­
sulting with the SEC.
The AICPA’s formation of an SEC 
practice section, a peer review pro­
cess, and a POB has illustrated the 
profession’s commitment to oversight 
and quality control. However, the over­
sight and peer review process require 
that disciplinary bodies penalize those 
who perform substandard work. The 
failure of the oversight and peer review 
process to adequately discipline the 
profession is just one of the self- 




In order for self-regulation to be ef­
fective, more than the self-interest of 
those regulated must be considered. 
A problem facing self-regulation is that 
of overcoming the reservations of both 
members of the profession and the 
public. A few members of a profession 
naturally resist all forms of regulation 
while some citizens see private regula­
tion as a collusion of members aiming 
to deceive those who are supposed to 
be served.5
Other matters which must be con­
sidered are the misconceptions on the 
part of the public and members of the 
profession concerning self-regulation 
and public regulation. Some in­
dividuals expect to see a great deal of 
activity, indicating that self-regulation 
is functioning properly. However, the 
activity level in a self-regulatory pro­
cess is a less useful measure of con­
trol than in public regulation. As 
mentioned earlier, some members of 
Public regulation emphasizes 
punishment; self-regulation 
stresses remedies and 
avoidance.
the regulated profession will not 
perceive a change from their 
unregulated state and will be un­
cooperative regarding new or formal 
regulation.6
Further, problems can occur in the 
relationship between the profession 
being regulated and the group who is 
responsible for oversight. A lack of at­
tention to oversight leads to unques­
tioned self-regulation; too much atten­
tion can lead to public regulation.7
Perhaps, the biggest problem in the 
current self-regulatory system is the 
failure of the AICPA to make member­
ship in the SECPS or PCPS man­
datory. This failure is especially 
noteworthy in light of the recent 
decline in SECPS membership. 
Reasons cited for this decline include 
peer review costs and unwillingness to 
undergo peer review.8 Without in­
creased involvement in the division, 
the profession’s commitment to over­
sight and quality control is 
questionable.
A final consideration involves the 
level of competition in the profession. 
While the number of accounting firms 
has increased, the client base has re­
mained essentially at the same level. 
The result of firms’ efforts to maintain 
or expand their client base has often 
led to price cutting. Unfortunately, a 
decline in the quality of service offered 
has frequently accompanied these 
price cutting measures.
Need For Proper Balance
Although public regulation and self­
regulation are directed toward similar 
ends, they vary significantly in the 
means used to achieve those ends. 
For example, requirements dictated by 
public regulation are enforced through 
state and federal authority; self­
regulation can only invoke sanctions or 
exclude members from group 
benefits.9
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If self-regulation is to work, a 
moral regeneration is needed.
While public regulation emphasizes 
punishment for misconduct, self­
regulation stresses remedies and 
avoidance. One reason for this dif­
ference in methods is that the public 
demands intensified public regulation 
after it perceives misconduct; in their 
eyes punishment is viewed as a strong 
deterrent. Self-regulation’s emphasis 
on remedy is based on a desire to treat 
the profession’s members fairly, in ad­
dition to serving the public. It is felt that 
the public is best served by dealing 
with the cause of the problem.10
Prospects For the Future
A balance of private rights and 
public responsibility is necessary to 
measure how well professions meet 
standards. According to Jacques Bar­
zun in “The Professions Under 
Siege,” long-time monopoly status has 
caused professions to forget that their 
privileges were given in return for 
public benefit. In order to achieve a 
balancing of private rights and public 
responsibility. Barzun proposes that a 
moral regeneration is needed. Moral 
regeneration will not develop as a 
result of internal minimum standards 
or policing from the outside; it “can 
come about only when the members 
of a group feel once more confident 
that ethical behavior is desirable, wide­
ly practiced, approved, and 
admired.”11 Self-regulation of the ac­
counting profession will be successful 
only when it embraces these condi­
tions wholeheartedly and unre­
servedly.
Despite skepticism about regulation 
and the quality of service offered by 
the profession, the public and govern­
ment want accountants to take more 
responsibility to ensure the accoun­
tability of major institutions. Thus, the 
role of the accounting profession has 
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expanded as corporate and govern­
mental accountability have come 
under the scrutiny of public interest 
groups. The greater influence of the 
accounting profession further arouses 
its critics to demand stronger supervi­
sion from the outside. “Thus, the ma­
jor challenge facing the profession in 
the next decade is to remain a self­
regulating entity in the private sector 
even as its public mission and respon­
sibility grow.”12
Summary and Conclusions
In recent years there has been a 
change in outsiders’ views of the ac­
counting profession. No longer seeing 
the profession as an institution 
dedicated to quality service and in­
tegrity, public interest groups, the 
press, and congressional committees 
have threatened the profession with 
much more stringent regulation from 
external sources. The accounting pro­
fession has responded to such threats 
by revising its self-regulatory program 
to include the SECPS, peer review, 
and the POB. Despite the various con­
cerns from external sources about this 
form of self-regulation, its goal of ser­
vice parallels goals usually cited for 
public regulation.
The accounting profession now finds 
itself at a juncture. The FASB con­
tinues to be criticized; self-regulation 
has probably not worked as well as it 
should because of practitioners’ 
resistance; and increased competition
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has led some to conclude that many 
members have forgotten their primary 
service responsibility.
If self-regulation is to work, a moral 
regeneration is needed. Members 
must once more believe that ethical 
behavior is essential, that service is far 
more important than market share or 
profits, and that inferior performance 
cannot be tolerated. Ω
NOTES
1Jacques Barzun, “The Professions Under 
Siege,’’ Harper’s, October 1978, pp. 62-63.
2lbid., p. 63.
3J. Michael Cook and Haldon G. Robinson, 
“Peer Review — The Accounting Profession’s 
Program,” The CPA Journal, March 1979, p. 12.
4John C. Burton, “A Critical Look at Profes­
sionalism and Scope of Services,” Journal of Ac­
countancy, April 1980, p. 55.
5Robert K. Mautz, “Self-Regulation — Perils 




8John J. McCloy, “Accomplishments of the 
SECPS: the POB’s Assessment,” Journal of Ac­




12Gilbert Simonetti, Jr., “Remaining Self­
Regulating,” The CPA Journal, February 1980, 
pp. 5, 7.
Larry N. Killough, Ph.D., CPA, is 
professor of accounting at Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State 
University. He has a Ph.D. from the 
University of Missouri. He is a 
member of the Virginia Society of 
CPAs, the AICPA and the AAA.
